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Introduction 
Climate change has arrived centre-stage on the EU’s policy agenda. The new 
President of the Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, announced in 2019 that 
Europe would be the frst climate-neutral continent by 2050 and introduced the 
European Green Deal and the frst EU climate laws as part of the project to 
achieve this goal. Externally, the EU plays a major role in international climate 
negotiations, partly to meet its global leadership aspirations, and partly to ensure 
that European manufacturing is not undercut by producers with lower environ-
mental standards. Climate change also features prominently in EU foreign policy, 
where it is framed as part of a series of nexuses, connecting it with migration, 
security and confict. The need to address climate change rests against a back-
drop of crisis – economic, environmental, health and political – building a sense 
of urgency and strategic prioritisation. One of the consequences of this is the 
sidelining of gender equality, despite the EU’s repeated assertions of its commit-
ment to mainstreaming the goal of gender equality throughout all its internal and 
external activities. 
This chapter draws on feminist institutionalism and the literature on policy 
integration, including gender mainstreaming, to show how and why gender is 
excluded from EU external climate policy. It asks, frstly, where, in external 
climate policy, do we fnd references to gender and what, if anything, do they 
contribute to achieving gender-just climate policy. Secondly, it asks how femi-
nist institutionalism and policy integration studies can help us understand why 
gender equality is not mainstreamed in EU external policy and what institutional 
obstacles prevent its integration. I argue that gender has been excluded from 
EU external climate policy by a combination of institutional power struggles; a 
discourse of crisis and security, which pushes gender into the background; and a 
proliferation of nexuses and mainstreaming imperatives in which the treaty obli-
gation to mainstream gender is pushed to one side. 
EU climate policy 
EU climate policy has three main components: mitigation, adaptation and cli-
mate diplomacy. Mitigation refers to strategies for reducing climate change, 
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largely through the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. Adaptation refers to 
strategies for adapting to the effects of climate change, such as increased food-
ing, droughts and unpredictable weather patterns. Climate diplomacy refers to 
the EU’s role in international climate negotiations and agreements, an area in 
which it has sought to assert leadership. However, fnancial, economic, and polit-
ical crises from 2008 slowed internal climate policy, and internal opposition to 
strong climate action has grown, particularly from central and eastern European 
member states, including Poland (Dupont and Oberthür, 2015, p. 229). While 
initially, the EU’s ambitions exceeded its own internal practice, since the mid-
2000s it has tried to ‘lead by example’. The EU, along with its member states, is 
a signatory to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) and plays a key role in trying to reach agreements on global tar-
gets (Biedenkopf and Dupont, 2013). The EU was an infuential player in the 
2015 Paris Agreement, the frst universal, legally binding climate agreement and 
continues to try to push global targets upwards (Oberthür and Groen, 2018). 
Key policy frameworks are the Climate and Energy Package for the period 
2020–2030 (COM [2014] 15 fnal), which sets out targets for greenhouse gas emis-
sions reductions, renewable energy and energy effciency; and the Environmental 
Action Programme, which provides an overarching framework for all environ-
mental and climate policy. The European Green Deal (2019) sets out a strategy 
for achieving net-zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2050 while sustaining eco-
nomic growth. The frst ‘climate law’ (COM [2020] 80 fnal) was proposed in 
early 2020, aiming to enshrine in legislation the objective of climate neutrality 
by 2050. 
Since 2013, internal EU climate policy has also included an adaptation strat-
egy, in recognition that climate change is having an impact within the EU, as 
well as, more obviously, elsewhere. While climate change mitigation was more 
readily framed as an issue to be dealt with at the EU level, adaptation to the 
effects of climate change appeared, until recently, to require local responses or 
to be of concern only in countries hit most severely by the impact of climate 
change, which are concentrated in the Global South. The foods and heatwaves 
of the early 2000s raised awareness of the impact of climate change within the EU 
and of its cross-border nature (Rayner and Jordan, 2010). As a consequence, the 
EU’s adaptation strategy was adopted in 2013 (COM(2018) 738 fnal). Member 
states are encouraged to produce national adaptation strategies, setting out, for 
example, how they will climate-proof their transport, energy and agriculture 
sectors, and protect their populations from fooding, droughts and heatwaves. 
As part of EU external relations, however, adaptation has a longer history. The 
visible impact of climate change in developing countries, and the use of devel-
opment aid for adaptation purposes, means that climate change has long been 
prominent in EU development policy. A Commission Communication in 2003 
(COM [2003] 85 fnal) declared climate change a development, as well as an 
environmental, problem. This has implications for the study of gender and EU 
climate policy, as will be demonstrated later. The well-established nature of 
gender and development within the European Commission and the European 
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Parliament (especially its FEMM Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender 
Equality and the Committee on Development) means that adaptation has been 
the core concern of gender and climate change analyses and policy proposals 
emanating from these institutions. 
The EU’s internal and external climate policies are dealt with by different 
decision-making institutions and processes. The European Commission is respon-
sible for drafting EU legislative proposals. The newly appointed President, Ursula 
von der Leyen, has declared climate change one of her top priorities, and the 
European Green Deal (2019) was introduced as one of the new Commission’s frst 
actions. Internal EU climate policy is proposed by the Commission Directorate-
General for Climate Action, DG CLIMA, which was created in 2010. However, 
climate change cannot be addressed by discrete policy measures. Energy, environ-
ment, agriculture, transport and trade all play a crucial role. Successfully meeting 
climate targets requires other policy sectors to integrate climate change into their 
work, as will be discussed later in this chapter. 
Externally, climate change appears in foreign, security, external migration and 
international development policy. Since the Paris Agreement (2015), external 
climate policy has included supporting partner countries with the formulation 
and implementation of their Nationally Determined Contributions (European 
Commission, 2019, p. 62). The EU’s Global Climate Change Alliance Plus 
initiative (GCCA+) has fostered policy dialogue with, and support for climate 
action in partner countries, mainly Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and 
Small Island Developing States (SIDS) (European Commission, 2019, p. 64). 
Before the Lisbon Treaty (2009), climate change, like other EU policy issues, 
was expected to align with the principle of Policy Coherence for Development. 
Policy Coherence for Development is a treaty obligation and is intended to 
prevent EU policies in areas other than international development undermin-
ing development objectives. This applies to all EU activities, including climate 
action. Impact assessments are supposed to be conducted to ensure that proposed 
actions will not have adverse effects on developing countries. However, the rela-
tive weakness of development policy institutions within the EU; the hierarchy of 
political priorities; and the poor implementation of the impact assessment obliga-
tion mean that Policy Coherence for Development has been more of a rhetorical 
commitment than an accomplishment. The Lisbon Treaty (2009) brought about 
a shift in emphasis, with development objectives being set alongside new strategic 
priorities, such as security and migration, and then gradually losing place to them. 
Development policy is increasingly required to serve the interests of a security-
focused foreign policy. According to the Global Strategy (High Representative of 
the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 2016), which is the overarch-
ing statement of EU foreign policy, ‘Development policy needs to become more 
fexible and aligned with our strategic priorities’. EU foreign and security policy 
frames climate change as a security threat and a root cause of migration (High 
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 2016, p. 27). 
The Council Conclusions on Climate Diplomacy of 26 February 2018 state that: 
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become an even greater source of global risk, including forced displacement and 
migration’. Development policy is now expected to mainstream climate change 
adaptation to render partner countries more resilient when coping with climate 
change consequences in order to address the root causes of the migration crisis. 
The European Consensus on Development (2017) calls for climate change inte-
gration across all sectors of development cooperation. It commits to addressing 
the root causes of migration, including climate change. This is a reversal of the 
expectation prior to the Lisbon Treaty that climate action would be coherent 
with development policy objectives. 
The European Commission’s framing of the EU’s global role stresses the 
importance of access to 
partner countries’ markets, infrastructure and critical raw materials. This 
starts with enhancing the EU’s energy and climate diplomacy, and with fur-
ther mainstreaming climate change objectives and considerations in politi-
cal dialogues, including in the area of migration, security and development 
cooperation. 
(COM [2018]773 fnal) 
Climate mainstreaming is seen as a way to achieve the EU’s trade, security and 
migration priorities, and is, therefore, a core priority for external action. 
Where does gender ft into EU external climate policy? 
This section of the chapter gives an overview of EU gender equality policy, show-
ing where it intersects with climate policy. Focusing on external climate policy, 
it then asks where we can fnd references to gender and what, if anything, they 
contribute to achieving gender-just climate policy. 
The EU is committed to mainstreaming gender throughout all of its inter-
nal and external activities. Article 8 of the TFEU states: ‘in all its activi-
ties, the Union shall aim to eliminate inequalities, and to promote equality,
between men and women’. EU institutions still tend to frame gender equality
as ‘equality between men and women’, ignoring the heterogeneity of these
two categories, the power relations within, as well as between, them, and the
intersection of other structural inequalities with gender. There are institu-
tional pockets in which a more nuanced gender analysis emerges. These will
be discussed where they relate to external climate policy. The EU’s approach
to gender equality is contained in its Gender Equality Strategy, the most
recent version of which was launched in March 2020. The strategy makes
some move away from a focus on equality between women and men, aiming
to achieve 
a Europe where women and men, girls and boys, in all their diversity, are 
equal … The Commission will enhance gender mainstreaming by systemati-









policy areas, internal and external. The Strategy will be implemented using 
intersectionality as a cross-cutting principle. 
(p. 2) 
Although there is no detail about how this will be done, the recognition of inter-
sectionality is an important step away from equating gender equality solely with a 
men–women binary. An intersectional analytical lens has been used by feminist 
scholars to make important contributions to our understanding of the impact of 
climate change and responses to it (Nagel, 2012; Tschakert and Machado, 2012; 
Kaijser and Kronsell, 2014; MacGregor, 2014; Sultana, 2014). Intersectionality 
can help us understand individual and group-based differences in relation to cli-
mate change. Rather than designating women as vulnerable victims of climate 
change, an intersectional approach demonstrates that social structures based 
on characteristics such as gender, socio-economic status, ethnicity, national-
ity, health, sexual orientation, age and place infuence the responsibility, vul-
nerability and decision-making power of individuals and groups. For example, 
Kronsell’s (2013) study of Sweden shows that there are gendered differences in 
energy consumption and transportation. She argues, however, that it is important 
to recognise that gender is not the only relevant factor; sometimes class mat-
ters more than gender and there are considerable differences within the Global 
North and Global South. An intersectional analysis asks which social categories 
are included in, and excluded from, the cases in question, what assumptions are 
made about social categories, and what type of knowledge is privileged (Kaijser 
and Kronsell, 2014). Buckingham and Le Masson (2017, pp. 2–3) argue that, 
If gender, and gender equality, is to be a meaningful policy objective, it must be
recognised that it comprises relations between women and men, and between
and among different groups of women and men, not to mention between
different conceptualisations of masculinity and femininity, which can each
be practised by either, and both, women and men … Understanding gender
inequality also requires a simultaneous understanding of social and economic
divisions based on class, ethnicity, age, disability, religion, sexuality, parent-
hood, among others, and how these divisions intersect to compound particu-
lar disadvantages and inequalities between and within social groups. 
Internally, the EU’s concern with gender equality has focused primarily on equal 
pay for equal work, a principle enshrined in the treaties since the Treaty of Rome 
(1957). The EU has been committed to gender mainstreaming since 1996, mean-
ing that gender equality should be integrated into all areas and at all stages of 
policy-making. However, key areas of activity remain untouched, including 
energy, trade and transport. The European Parliament’s FEMM Committee has 
highlighted many of these gaps in a series of reports and resolutions, as has the 
European Institute for Gender Equality (EIGE). For example, EIGE (2016), 
fnds that the European Commission has only just begun to recognise the links 
between gender and transport, and according to the European Parliament (2018), 
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‘current EU trade policy and its “Trade for All” strategy … lack a gender equality 
perspective’. 
Gender equality and women’s empowerment are declared core objectives of 
EU external action (Gender Equality Strategy 2020–2025). Since 2015, the sec-
ond Gender Action Plan (GAPII), has required all actors in EU external action 
to implement and report on gender mainstreaming, specifc actions and political 
dialogue in relation to gender equality. GAPII also introduced a cross-cutting 
priority: Institutional Cultural Shift. This was based on the recognition that gen-
der equality will only be achieved once there is a signifcant change in institu-
tional culture. It will be discussed in the next section of this chapter. The original 
Gender Action Plan (2010) was created within the Directorate-General (DG) 
for Development and aimed to translate gender and development commitments 
into effective policy outcomes. This illustrates the importance of EU develop-
ment policy institutions in raising awareness of gender equality, gender main-
streaming and gender analysis. The strong infuence within DG Development 
of Gender and Development experts and advocates has resulted in development 
cooperation being the most gender-aware area of EU policy. In the wake of the 
Lisbon Treaty, the creation of the European External Action Service, and the 
restructuring of DG DEVCO, the second Gender Action Plan, GAPII (2015– 
2019), applied to all areas of EU external action, not just development policy, 
and to all actors, including EU headquarters in Brussels, EU delegations in part-
ner countries and member states. This shift from development to external action 
has diluted the infuence of gender and development activists and advocates on 
the framing of gender equality issues, and gender equality remains less well inte-
grated into areas of external action outside international development. 
Development policy documents continue to enshrine a long-standing commit-
ment to gender equality. For example, the European Consensus on Development 
(2017, para 15) states that: 
gender equality is at the core of the EU’s values and is enshrined in its legal 
and political framework. It is vital for achieving the SDGs and cuts across 
the whole 2030 Agenda. The EU and its Member States will promote wom-
en’s and girls’ rights, gender equality, the empowerment of women and girls 
and their protection as a priority across all areas of action. 
In line with the UN’s 2030 Agenda and with growing awareness of diversity 
and intersectionality, the European Consensus on Development (2017, para 16) 
moves beyond a focus on gender alone: 
the EU and its Member States will continue to play a key role in ensuring 
that no-one is left behind, wherever people live and regardless of ethnic-
ity, gender, age, disability, religion or beliefs, sexual orientation and gender 
identity, migration status or other factors. This approach includes addressing 
the multiple discriminations faced by vulnerable people and marginalised 
groups. 
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Statements of commitment to gender mainstreaming are pervasive in EU for-
eign and security policy, including external climate policy. The Global Strategy 
(High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 2016, 
11 and 51), states that: ‘we must systematically mainstream human rights and 
gender issues across policy sectors and institutions’. The Council Conclusions 
on Climate Diplomacy of 26 February 2018, state that: ‘gender equality, wom-
en’s empowerment and women’s full and equal participation and leadership are 
vital to achieving sustainable development, including climate change adapta-
tion’. The Council Conclusions on Climate Diplomacy of 18 February 2019 state 
that: ‘the EU will continue to uphold, promote and protect human rights, gen-
der equality and women’s empowerment in the context of climate action’. The 
European Council Strategic Agenda 2019–2024, sets out as one of its four main 
priorities a climate-neutral, green, fair and social Europe, stating that ‘Europe 
needs inclusiveness and sustainability, embracing the changes brought about by 
the green transition, technological evolution and globalisation, while making 
sure no-one is left behind’. In this section, it adds: ‘we need to do more to ensure 
equality between women and men, as well as rights and opportunities for all. This 
is both a societal imperative and an economic asset’. 
These statements can be read as all-embracing or as add-ons to unchanged 
gender-blind policy. They are now systemic in EU external policy and can pro-
vide leverage for gender equality advocates, both inside and outside EU institu-
tions, but they can also suggest that the problem has been resolved, removing 
incentives to address it. 
In contrast, the European Green Deal (2019) is completely gender blind. It 
makes no reference to gender/women, although it does say that the transition 
to a climate-neutral economy must be ‘just and inclusive’ and must ‘put people 
frst’ (p. 2). The European Green Deal mostly concerns internal policy, but a sec-
tion on ‘the EU as a Global Leader’ stresses the importance of increasing climate 
resilience in partner countries to avoid ‘confict, food insecurity, population dis-
placement and forced migration’. The EU’s efforts to ‘lead by example’ in climate 
action are important, but the gender blindness of climate policy means that any 
norms it exports will also be gender blind. 
One of the reasons why gender is absent from the European Green Deal is that 
(gender) equality and climate action are presented as two of the new Commission’s 
top priorities, but they are kept separate from one another. Elements of gender-
awareness in relation to climate change exist in fragments of EU policy, but they 
lack coherence. The Gender Equality Strategy has a short section on climate 
change which points out some of the ways in which climate change is gendered 
and argues that, ‘Addressing the gender dimension can therefore have a key 
role in leveraging the full potential of these policies’. GAPII refers to climate 
issues only twice. The frst reference states that the Commission’s services and 
European External Action Service will contribute to ‘women’s increased partici-
pation in decision-making processes on climate and environmental issues’ and 
Objective 20 in Annex 1 is: ‘equal rights enjoyed by women to participate in 
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This is the objective least often reported upon. There are also reports on gender 
and climate change by EIGE and the European Parliament, some of which are 
limited to counting the numbers of women in climate decision-making, and some 
of which contain sophisticated gender analyses of climate issues and responses. 
The EIGE (2019) report, for example, reiterates the EU’s obligations to integrate 
gender equality into its climate change policies, in line with the UNFCCC Lima 
Work Programme on Gender and the 2017 Gender Action Plan, as well as with 
the EU’s own gender mainstreaming commitments. However, EIGE argues that 
these have not been translated into concrete actions, and EU climate policy has 
remained largely gender blind. 
To summarise, climate change is mentioned briefy in gender equality docu-
ments, such as GAPII and the Gender Equality Strategy, but the major climate 
framework document of 2019, the European Green Deal, is gender blind. The 
Social Development Goals (SDGs) offer the potential to bring gender equality 
and climate change together, but this has not yet been realised, including within 
EU policy-making. 
A feminist institutionalist analysis of gender and EU external 
climate policy 
The previous section has shown that gender equality is not mainstreamed in
EU external climate policy. Can feminist institutionalism help us to understand
why this is the case? Feminist institutionalism tells us that institutions matter,
that they are ridden with gendered power relations, and that they are resistant to
change. Feminist institutionalism (Mackay et al., 2009; Krook and Mackay, 2011;
Chappell and Waylen, 2013; Waylen, 2013) can help explain the gap between
formal commitments to gender mainstreaming and gender equality in all policy
areas and at all stages of policy-making and, on the other hand, persistently gen-
der-blind policy in particular areas, in this case, climate change. It enables us to
examine the institutional constraints, opportunities and resistances that affect
gender mainstreaming within climate change policy-making. Feminist institu-
tionalism emphasises the importance of informal practices, norms and values,
exposing the ways in which they can constrain or distort formal rules (Chappell
and Waylen, 2013; Waylen, 2013). A focus on the informal rules of the game
provides clues that can contribute to explaining the gap between the rhetoric and
reality of gender mainstreaming in specifc areas of EU policy. Focusing on the
relation between formal rules and informal practices can help us understand why
gender mainstreaming – which is formally compulsory in all policy areas and all
stages of policy-making – is ignored, overlooked, pushed down the agenda or out to
the margins, while the main business of climate change policy-making continues
unperturbed. Drawing on sociological institutionalism, feminist institutionalism
suggests that actors are constrained by cultural conventions, norms and cognitive
frames of reference which privilege a certain way of thinking about a policy prob-
lem and ensure that other perspectives remain submerged from view (Lowndes














focus on the construction and contestation of meaning in the interaction between
gender mainstreaming and climate change policies (Schmidt, 2012). Gender
mainstreaming is interpreted and re-interpreted in day-to-day institutional inter-
actions. Individual and collective actors engage in struggles to impose their under-
standings of gender mainstreaming, and this is affected by the broader context
of institutional power imbalances that push issues such as gender equality to the
centre or the margins of particular policy debates. It can reveal ways in which
gender mainstreaming is imbued with new meanings in day-to-day policy-making
practices. It can highlight the ways in which issues are constructed as certain types
of problem requiring certain types of solution. This can act as a constraint on those
pushing other meanings. The special issue of Political Studies Review on gender
and external action shows that in times of crisis, gender equality is pushed off the
agenda (Muehlenhoff et al., 2020). Studies on the gendered impact of COVID-19
have revealed the same effect (John et al., 2020). Crisis discourse wrongly pro-
claims that ‘we are all in this together’, whereas Cynthia Enloe (2020) insists that 
we are not all in this together. We’re on the same rough seas, but we’re 
in very different boats. And some of those boats are very leaky. And some 
of those boats were never given oars. And some of those boats have high-
powered motors on them. We are not all in the same boat. 
The EU’s institutions have very different institutional cultures. The European 
Parliament, for example, has traditionally been greener and more gender equal-
ity-friendly than the Council, but can be squeezed out of decision-making, par-
ticularly in areas where member states seek to retain control. The Council has 
retained exceptional control of climate policy-making, meaning that the mem-
ber states have more infuence and the European Parliament has less infuence 
than is set out in the treaties (Dupont, 2019). Climate and gender equality lag-
gards, often from central and eastern Europe, can water down policy in both 
of these areas. EU decision-making is famously sectoral, although some cross-
sectoral structures exist, for example, the European Parliament’s gender main-
streaming group and the promised Task Force for Equality in the Commission. 
Power relations between external climate institutions affect their relative ability 
to frame climate change. For example, the European Parliament Development 
Committee and the European Commission’s Directorate-General for develop-
ment are relatively weak. In contrast, security and migration institutions and 
frames are dominating the external climate policy agenda (Youngs, 2014). The 
Lisbon Treaty enhanced external action, but reduced the profle of development 
within it. There is also a gap between policy formulation in Brussels and imple-
mentation by the EUDs in the partner countries. As Debusscher and Manners 
(2020) point out, it is not just about what happens in the institutions in Brussels. 
External climate policy is also made and implemented in the delegations in the 
partner countries and in partnership with the partner countries. Studies have 
shown that gender mainstreaming is not consistently present in these institutions 
and processes (Allwood, 2018). 
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Institutional resistance to gender-sensitive change was recognised in GAPII 
which applies to all external action and contains an important cross-cutting pri-
ority: Institutional Cultural Shift. This means ‘shifting the Commission services 
and the European External Action Service’s institutional culture to more effec-
tively deliver on EU commitments’. Institutional Cultural Shift was based on 
the idea that change will only be brought about once a systemic shift has taken 
place. This aligns with Rao and Kelleher’s (2005) work on gender and organisa-
tions, which argues that effective gender mainstreaming needs transformational 
institutional change. It is a response to the recognition that organisations matter 
and that they are ‘sticky’. Path dependency might explain why climate change 
continues to be framed as a scientifc, elitist, technical and masculinised issue. As 
Cornwall and Rivas (2015, p. 400) argue, ‘Ultimately, a paradigm transformation 
is needed to reclaim the gender agenda and address the underlying structures of 
constraint that give these inequalities the systemic character and the persistence 
over time’. 
Institutional Cultural Shift and changing mindsets are essential for gender 
transformation, but will not be effective without political will. Gender composi-
tion at management level in the European External Action Service is worse than 
in the European Parliament, European Commission and Council. Chappell and 
Guerrina (2020, p. 8) fnd that, 
A common normative stance within the European External Action Service 
has not yet fully evolved, indicating that where a gender perspective does 
occur, it is unlikely to have dispersed across the European External Action 
Service. Hence, there may well be ‘pockets’ of gender actorness, but not 
full gender mainstreaming. From an institutional perspective, this relates not 
only to how many women are working within the European External Action 
Service but also whether offcials are looking at EU foreign policy through 
a gender lens. 
Efforts to integrate gender equality in the institutions continue. The European 
External Action Service Gender and Equal Opportunities Strategy 2018–2023, 
aims to achieve gender equality in the European External Action Service in 
the broadest sense, whereby women and men enjoy equal rights, equal obli-
gations and equal opportunities across the Service … through accelerated 
progress towards gender balance and accelerated Institutional Cultural Shift 
in the European External Action Service. 
(p. 6) 
This is justifed in terms of productivity and effectiveness: 
measures will be put in place for the sustainable transformation of institu-
tional refexes and individual mindsets. Transformational measures will aim 
to counteract stereotypes, unintended bias and prejudices while at the same 
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time fostering inclusivity, diversity and collaboration through training, men-
toring, coaching, networking and innovative learning and through provid-
ing equal development opportunities for women and men. 
(p. 8) 
However, the European Parliament draft report on Gender Equality in the EU’s 
Foreign and Security Policy 2019/2167 (INI), of 27 March 2020, calls for more 
precision and specifc targets on gender and diversity in this strategy. It also calls 
for member states to create a formal Council working group on gender equality, 
argues that the European External Action Service Principal Advisor on gender 
equality requires more staff and resources, and calls on the Vice President/High 
Representative to ensure that heads of European Union Delegations (EUDs) 
abroad ensure that gender equality is mainstreamed throughout all of the delega-
tion’s work and that there is a full-time gender focal point in each delegation. 
An additional obstacle to mainstreaming gender throughout all EU exter-
nal climate policy is that the latter is itself constructed as a cross-cutting issue. 
Gender mainstreaming is implemented more easily in discrete policy sectors and 
is more diffcult to apply to other cross-cutting issues. There is a long-standing 
and widespread understanding that some objectives cannot be reached by treat-
ing them as standalone goals, but that they need to be woven into all areas of 
decision-making and at all stages. This is referred to as mainstreaming (as in gen-
der mainstreaming), policy integration (as in environmental policy integration), 
or policy coherence (as in policy coherence for development). Collectively, 
they can be referred to as horizontal policy coordination. Gender mainstream-
ing, environmental policy integration and policy coherence for development are 
all treaty-based obligations. As policy-makers increasingly refer to cross-cutting 
issues and to policy nexuses, we need a way to understand and improve how they 
intersect. 
We can draw on the literature on horizontal policy coordination and policy 
nexuses to try to understand how policy issues interconnect and what happens 
when they do. This literature considers how cross-cutting issues are integrated 
into policy sectors. It shows where this works and where it fails, and suggests 
explanations for these outcomes (De Roeck et al., 2018). It suggests that suc-
cessful policy coherence requires a strong shared vision which acts as a strate-
gic goal and maintains focus on the objective, and not on the procedural tools 
and instruments. The substantial literature on gender mainstreaming shows 
that, despite repeated rhetorical commitments by EU actors, it is still absent 
from key policy areas and is often treated as procedural, rather than substan-
tive (Meier and Celis, 2011; Allwood, 2013; Guerrina and Wright, 2016). Kok 
and de Corninck’s (2007, pp. 587–599) study of climate change mainstreaming 
shows that organisational structures were not designed for cooperation, coordi-
nation and joint decision-making on different levels. There are power imbal-
ances between different Commission DGs; between different confgurations of 
the Council of Ministers; and between the Council, the European Parliament 
and the Commission. The European Parliament, and in particular its various 
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committees on the environment, development and gender equality, have been 
increasingly active in advocating the mainstreaming of these issues throughout 
all European Parliament decision-making, but the European Parliament can be 
excluded from forms of decision-making dominated by intergovernmentalism, 
and this applies to most of the Union’s climate change policy. Power imbalances 
and inter-institutional rivalries mean that issues such as environmental protec-
tion can struggle to impinge on policies shored up by powerful economic interests 
such as trade and agriculture. Institutional resistance, often based on powerful 
economic interests, is identifed as the main obstacle by Gupta and van der Grijp 
(2010), in their study of climate change mainstreaming. Climate change main-
streaming threatens the status quo and unsettles the vested interests of industry 
and the energy lobby. Resistance is therefore strong. Any policy competition or 
struggle for scarce resources will expose these imbalances, and rhetorical commit-
ment to mainstreaming may lack underlying substance, particularly in times of 
economic crisis. 
EU external policy increasingly uses the term ‘nexus’ to describe the inter-
section between two or more policy areas (Lavenex and Kunz, 2009; Carbone, 
2013; Furness and Gänzle, 2017; De Roeck et al., 2018). Climate change is situ-
ated in a series of nexuses, including climate-security and climate-migration. The 
Council Conclusions on Climate Diplomacy of 26 February 2018 ‘resolve … to 
further mainstream the nexus between climate change and security in political 
dialogue, confict prevention, development and humanitarian action and dis-
aster risk strategies’. While this is an important recognition that policy issues 
are intersecting and cannot be addressed in isolation from each other, it raises 
substantial questions about how gender can be mainstreamed throughout other 
cross-cutting issues. Allwood (2020a) found that gender equality is absent from 
the migration-security-climate nexuses which are driving development policy 
priorities. This makes mainstreaming even more challenging. Not only are cli-
mate change, migration and other cross-cutting issues to be mainstreamed in 
development cooperation and policy dialogue, but the nexus between them must 
also be mainstreamed. This raises questions about the practicalities of addressing 
complex webs of intersecting issues, especially when some of them are accorded 
priority status. It also creates a context in which the mainstreaming of gender 
becomes even more diffcult. 
Conclusion 
This feminist institutionalist analysis of EU external climate policy shows that the 
framing of climate change as a policy problem affects which institutions address it 
and which solutions are proposed. When climate change was framed as a devel-
opment issue, decisions were made by development institutions in the context of 
policy coherence for development. The relatively strong infuence of gender and 
development in DG DEV meant that there was some chance of external climate 
policy being tinged with gender awareness. Following the Lisbon Treaty, the 
creation of the European External Action Service, and the restructuring of DG 
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DEVCO, foreign and security policy gained prominence, and development policy 
became subservient to its priorities. Given that gender was relatively prominent 
in development policy, this contributed to gender slipping down the agenda. 
Crisis discourse accentuated this trend (Muehlenhoff et al., 2020). 
External relations gained prominence on the EU’s political agenda with the 
adoption of the Lisbon Treaty. The creation of the role of High Representative 
and the European External Action Service marked a new era in foreign and secu-
rity policy. These new institutional arrangements had consequences for both cli-
mate policy and gender equality. The new external agenda prioritised migration 
and security, and climate change was constructed as an external issue in relation 
to these priorities. The EU makes much of its foundational myth of gender equal-
ity (MacRae, 2010), and of the fact that gender equality is a fundamental value 
of the Union. Commitments to gender equality and to gender mainstreaming 
as a means of achieving it, abound in EU policy documents, both internal and 
external. Internal gender equality policy is closely linked to equality between 
women and men in the workplace. Present in the treaties since the foundation 
of the Common Market in 1957, equal pay for equal work (and later, work of 
equal value) has been at the heart of the EU’s gender equality narrative, even as 
the principle has extended to other areas of EU policy and has slowly begun to 
include other forms of inequality, discrimination and exclusion. Gender equality 
in external relations was, for many years, most visible in relation to development 
cooperation, which was infuenced by gender and development theory and prac-
tice. Gender awareness was higher than in other parts of EU external action and 
the Gender Action Plan of 2010, demonstrated a desire to implement commit-
ments to gender equality on the ground. This constituted an institutional context 
in which climate change as an issue affecting developing countries and the EU’s 
relations with them could potentially begin to be addressed in a gender-just fash-
ion. However, the reframing of climate change as a migration and security issue 
has acted as an obstacle to this. 
The construction of climate change as a problem which can be solved with 
market, technological and security solutions has, until recently, excluded a peo-
ple-centred approach, which could favour a gender-sensitive policy. There are 
signs that this is beginning to change very slowly. EU climate policy is edging away 
from an exclusive focus on technological solutions towards a recognition that cli-
mate change affects people, and that people are part of the solution. However, 
integrating diversity and intersectionality into the analysis of climate change and 
proposed responses to it is still a marginal concern (Allwood, 2020b). Efforts to 
address gender inequality and efforts to address climate change continue to exist 
in parallel, rather than being fully integrated into each other. Gender equality is 
not integrated into all aspects of decision-making and at all stages. Instead, it is 
tagged on or addressed in separate documents and debates, in what Acosta et al. 
(2019, p. 15) refer to as a ‘stale reproduction of set pieces of text [pointing to] sig-
nifcant levels of inertia in thinking and practice around gender mainstreaming 
issues’. This is a result of institutional stickiness, which makes it diffcult to bring 
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In addition to contributing to our understanding of why gender has not been
integrated into climate decision-making, this chapter also opens up the broader
question of how we can integrate gender throughout all (intersecting) policy in a
way that is transformative and sustainable (i.e. not just inserting the word gender
into policy documents, as Sherilyn MacGregor fears (2014, p. 624). If, as the SDGs
suggest, gender equality is a prerequisite for achieving sustainable development,
peace and security, and climate change mitigation and adaptation, then it must be
integrated into all of these policy areas, including the intersections between them. 
References 
Acosta M., van Bommel S. and van Wessel M. (2019) ‘Discursive Translations of Gender 
Mainstreaming Norms: The Case of Agricultural and Climate Change Policies in 
Uganda’, Women’s Studies International Forum, 74, pp. 9–19. 
Allwood G. (2013) ‘Gender Mainstreaming and Policy Coherence for Development: 
Unintended Gender Consequences and EU Policy’, Women’s Studies International 
Forum, 39, pp. 42–52. 
Allwood G. (2018) Transforming Lives? CONCORD Report EU Gender Action Plan II: 
From Implementation to Impact. Brussels: CONCORD. 
Allwood G. (2020a) ‘Gender Equality in European Union Development Policy in Times 
of Crisis’, Political Studies Review, 18(3), pp. 329–345. 
Allwood G. (2020b) ‘Mainstreaming Gender and Climate Change to Achieve a Just 
Transition to a Climate-Neutral Europe’, Journal of Common Market Studies. https://doi
.org/10.1111/jcms.13082 
Biedenkopf K. and Dupont C. (2013) ‘A Toolbox Approach to the EU’s External Climate 
Governance’, in Boening A., Kremer J.-F., and van Loon A. (eds) Global Power Europe 
Volume 1. Berlin: Springer-Verlag, pp.181–199. 
Buckingham S. and Le Masson V. (2017) ‘Introduction’, in Buckingham S. and Le Masson 
V. (eds) Understanding Climate Change Through Gender Relations. London and New 
York: Routledge, pp. 1–12. 
Carbone M. (2013) ‘International Development and the European Union’s External 
Policies: Changing Contexts, Problematic Nexuses, Contested Partnerships’, Cambridge 
Review of International Affairs, 26(3), pp. 483–496. 
Chappell L. and Guerrina R. (2020) ‘Understanding the Gender Regime in the European 
External Action Service’, Cooperation and Confict, 55(2), pp. 261–280. 
Chappell L. and Waylen G. (2013) ‘Gender and the Hidden Life of Institutions’, Public 
Administration 91(3), pp. 599–615. 
Cornwall A. and Rivas A. (2015) ‘From “Gender Equality” and “Women’s Empowerment” 
to Global Justice: Reclaiming a Transformative Agenda for Gender and Development’, 
Third World Quarterly, 36(2), pp. 396–415. 
De Roeck F., Orbie J. and Delputte S. (2018) ‘Mainstreaming Climate Change Adaptation 
into the European Union’s Development Assistance’, Environmental Science & Policy, 
81, pp. 36–45. 
Debusscher P. and Manners I. (2020) ‘Understanding the European Union as a Global 
Gender Actor: The Holistic Intersectional and Inclusive Study of Gender+ in External 
Actions’, Political Studies Review, 18(3), pp. 410–425. 
Dupont C. (2019) ‘The EU’s Collective Securitisation of Climate Change’, West European 
Politics, 42(2), pp. 369–390. 
  
   
          
                   
      
   
50 Gill Allwood
Dupont C. and Oberthür S. (2015) ‘The European Union’, in Bäckstrand K. and Lövbrand 
E. (eds) Research Handbook on Climate Governance. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, pp. 
224–236. 
European Commission (2019) Supporting the Sustainable Development Goals across the 
World. Joint Synthesis Report of the European Union and its Member States 2019. 
Enloe, C. (2020) ‘Why the Use of “War” Narratives are Dangerous in Times of COVID-
19’, Interview with Quaker Council for European Affairs. Brussels: QCEA, https://ww
w.youtube.com/watch?v=Gaif6mTwFw8, accessed 18 February 2021. 
European Institute for Gender Equality (EIGE) (2016) Gender in Transport. Vilnius: EIGE. 
European Parliament (2018) Report on Gender Equality in EU Trade Agreements, 
(2017/2015(INI), https://oeil.secure.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/popups/fcheprocedure.do
?lang=en&reference=2017/2015(INI), accessed 18 February 2021. 
Furness M. and Gänzle S. (2017) ‘The Security-Development Nexus in EU Foreign 
Relations after Lisbon: Policy Coherence at Last?’, Development Policy Review, 35(4), 
pp. 475–92. 
Guerrina R. and Wright K. (2016) ‘Gendering Normative Power Europe: Lessons of the 
Women, Peace and Security Agenda’, International Affairs, 92(2), pp. 293–312. 
Gupta J. and van der Grijp N. (2010) Mainstreaming Climate Change in Development 
Cooperation: Theory, Practice and Implications for the European Union, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (2016) Shared 
Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the European Union’s 
Foreign and Security Policy, http://europa.eu/globalstrategy/en, accessed 18 February 
2021. 
John N., Casey S.E. and Carino G., (2020) ‘Lessons Never Learned: Crisis and Gender-
Based Violence’, Developing World Bioethics, 20(2), pp. 65–68. 
Kaijser A. and Kronsell A. (2014) ‘Climate Change through the Lens of Intersectionality’, 
Environmental Politics, 23(3), pp. 417–433. 
Kok M. and de Coninck H. (2007) ‘Widening the Scope of Policies to Address Climate 
Change: Directions for Mainstreaming’, Environmental Science and Policy, 10, pp. 
587-599. 
Kronsell A. (2013) ‘Gender and Transition in Climate Governance’, Environmental 
Innovation and Societal Transitions, 7, pp. 1–15. 
Krook M.L. and Mackay F. (2011) ‘Introduction’, in Krook Mona L and Mackay F (eds). 
Gender, Politics and Institutions: Towards a Feminist Institutionalism. Basingstoke: 
Palgrave, pp. 1–20. 
Lavenex S. and Kunz R. (2009) ‘The Migration-Development Nexus in EU External 
Rleations’, in Carbone M. (ed). European Integration. Policy Coherence and EU 
Development Policy. Abingdon and New York: Routledge, pp. 439–457. 
Lowndes V. and Roberts M. (2013) Why Institutions Matter. The New Institutionalism in 
Political Science. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
MacGregor S. (2014). ‘Only Resist: Feminist Ecological Citizenship and the Post-Politics 
of Climate Change’, Hypatia, 29(3), pp. 617–633. 
Mackay F., Monro S. and Waylen G. (2009) ‘The Feminist Potential of Sociological 
Institutionalism’, Politics and Gender, 5(2), pp. 253–262. 
MacRae H. (2010) ‘The EU as a Gender Equality Polity: Myths and Realities’, Journal of 
Common Market Studies, 48(1), pp. 153–172. 
Meier P and Celis K (2011) ‘Sowing the Seeds of its Own Failure: Implementing the 
Concept of Gender Mainstreaming’, Social Politics, 18(4), pp. 469–489. 
  EU external climate policy 51 
Muehlenhoff H.L., van der Vleuten A. and Welfens N. (2020) ‘Slipping Off or Turning 
the Tide? Gender Equality in European Union’s External Relations in Times of Crisis’, 
Political Studies Review, 18(3), pp. 322–328. 
Nagel J. (2012) ‘Intersecting Identities and Global Climate Change’, Identities, 19(4), pp. 
467–476. 
Oberthür S. and Groen L. (2018) ‘Explaining Goal Achievement in International 
Negotiations: The EU and the Paris Agreement on Climate Change’, Journal of 
European Public Policy, 25(5), pp. 708–727. 
Rao A. and Kelleher D. (2005) ‘Is there Life after Gender Mainstreaming?’, Gender and 
Development, 13(2), pp. 57–69. 
Rayner T. and Jordan A. (2010) ‘Adapting to a Changing Climate: An Emerging EU 
Policy?’, in Jordan A, Huitema D, Van Asselt H. (eds). Climate Change Policy in the 
European Union. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 145–166. 
Schmidt V. (2012) ‘Foreword’, in Lombardo E and Forest M (eds). The Europeanization 
of Gender Equality Policies. A Discursive-Sociological Approach. Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, pp. xiii–xvi. 
Sultana F. (2014) ‘Gendering Climate Change: Geographical Insights’, The Professional 
Geographer, 66(3), pp. 372–381. 
Tschakert P. and Machado M. (2012) ‘Gender Justice and Rights in Climate Change 
Adaptation: Opportunities and Pitfalls’, Ethics and Social Welfare, 6(3), pp. 275–289. 
Waylen G. (2013) ‘Informal Institutions, Institutional Change, and Gender Equality’, 
Political Research Quarterly, 61(1), pp. 212–223. 
Youngs R. (2014) Climate Change and EU Security Policy: An Unmet Challenge. Brussels: 
Carnegie Europe. 
